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.Although the trial court correctly determined that the 
lease had terminated and did not, as defendants contend, 
err in omitting findings above discussed, it did err in deter-
mining that defendants have no right whatsoever in the real 
property and that plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession. 
Therefore, the judgment is reversed. Each party shall bear 
its own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Tray-
nor, J., and Spence, J., concurred . 
.Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 26, 
1952. 
[Sac. No. 6262. In Bank. June 10, 1952.] 
CALIFORNIA-WESTERN STATES LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
COMMISSION and CELESTINO AGUILAR, Respond-
ents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Liens.-An erroneous order of the 
Industrial Accident Commission denying claim of employer's 
unemployment disability insurance carrier for a lien against 
the State Compensation Insurance Fund, carrier of the em-
ployer's workmen's compensation insurance, cannot be saved 
by the latter carrier's payment, before the original order had 
become final, of compensation against which the lien should 
have been allowed, so as to defeat the unemployment disa-
bility insurance carrier's right to such lien. 
[2] !d.-Award-Collateral Attack.-Under Lab. Code, § 5302, 
any award of the Industrial Accident Commission is completely 
immune from collateral attack after the 20th day, even though 
in excess of its jurisdiction. 
[3] Id.-Award-Conclusiveness.-Lab. Code, § 5302, declaring 
that all orders and awards of the Industrial Accident Com-
mission are conclusively presumed to be reasonable and lawful 
unless modified or set aside within the time and in the man-
ner prescribed, was not intended to prevent effective recon-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4 J Workmen's Compensation, § 197; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 201; [3] Workmen's Compensa-
tion, § 199. 
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[4] 
sideration by the commission or review by the courts of awards 
which erroneously deny lien claims. 
!d.-Liens.-vVhere the State Compensation Insurance Fund 
illegally pays the entire amount of compensation to the injured 
employe after it has notice that the employer's unemployment 
disability insurance carrier claims a lien against it, it remains 
liable to such carrier for the amount of such lien, and the 
Industrial Accident Commission may order the State Fund 
to pay the lien. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission denying claim of employer's unemployment 
insurance carrier for lien against State Compensation Insur-
ance Fund. Order annulled. ' 
Sidney L. Weinstock, H. Harold Leavey and J. Richard 
Glade for Petitioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., Robert Ball and T. Groezinger 
for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner, carrier of employer's unemploy-
ment disability insurance under a voluntary plan (Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, 
art. 10, pt. 6) seeks review of an award of the Industrial 
Accident Commission which denies petitioner's claim for a 
lien against the State Compensation Insurance Fund, carrier 
of the employer's workmen's compensation insurance. The 
commission concedes, as it must, that its original order denying 
the lien was beyond its jurisdiction because contrary to Bryant 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32]. 
Before the original order became :final the workmen's com-
pensation insurance carrier paid the entire amount of com-
pensation to the employe; the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion then granted a rehearing. The commission takes the 
position that although petitioner's lien claim against the 
workmen's compensation insurance carrier should have been 
allowed it has now been lost because the latter carrier, before 
the original order had become :final, paid out the compensation 
against which the lien should have been allowed. We cannot 
sustain this position. 
The particular facts which gave rise to this controversy are 
as follows: On October 3, 1949, Celestino Aguilar sustained 
an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment and which resulted in disability. The State Fund, work-
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men's compensation insurance carrier for the employer, paid 
Aguilar temporary disability compensation until March 31, 
1950, then discontinued payments because of a dispute as to 
the nature and extent of disability. On April 19, 1950, 
Aguilar filed with the Industrial Accident Commission an 
application for adjustment of claim and, on the same date, 
petitioner commenced paying Aguilar unemployment com-
pensation disability benefits of $25 a week. 
Petitioner, with Aguilar's consent, requested the Industrial 
Accident Commission to allow a lien against any award of 
workmen's compensation. A copy of the request for and 
consent to allowance of lien was served on the State Fund on 
May 24, 1950, and filed on May 29, 1950. On October 10, 
1950, the Industrial Accident Commission awarded Aguilar 
$1,050 permanent partial disability compensation ($30 a week 
for 35 weeks commencing April 9, 1950) less $60 as a fee for 
Aguilar's attorneys, and denied petitioner's request for allow-
ance of a lien. The denial of lien was based on the commis-
sion's announced policy to deny liens for unemployment com-
pensation disability benefits against permanent disability com-
pensation; the question whether such policy could be upheld 
was then pending on review in the Bryant case. The State 
Fund paid Aguilar the $1,050 on October 26, 1950. On 
October 30 an application for rehearing was filed. The Indus-
trial Accident Commission granted a rehearing and withheld 
action pending final disposition of the Bryant case. After the 
Bryant decision ( st~pra, 37 Cal.2d 215), the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission issued its decision in this case; it allowed 
petitioner's claim of lien against Aguilar but denied its claim 
against the State Fund. 
As stated above, the Industrial Accident Commission con-
cedes that under the Bryant case its decision on October 10, 
1950, was in excess of its jurisdiction, but contends that never-
theless the petitioner is unable to claim a lien against the 
workmen's compensation insurance carrier. The Industrial 
Accident Commission relies on several Labor Code provisions. 
Section 5903 provides that within 20 days after service of an 
Industrial Accident Commission award a person aggrieved 
may attack it by petition to the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion for reconsideration. Section 5950 provides that within 
30 days after disposition of a petition for reconsideration, or 
reconsideration on the Industrial Accident Commission's own 
motion, any !Jcrson affected by the award may seek review by 
the District Court of Appeal or this court. Section 5302 
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provides that Industrial Accident Commission awards are 
"prima facie lawful and conclusively presumed to be reason-
able and lawful, until and unless they are modified or set 
aside" within the time and manner provided by law. Section 
3603 provides that payment of compensation in accordance 
with the order of the Industrial Accident Commission dis-
charges the employer from all claims therefor. 
In the present action the award of workmen's compensation 
was paid by the State Fund on the 16th day after the award 
was made, and the petition for rehearing was filed on the 20th 
day. The Industrial Accident Commission argues that its 
award was presumed valid until attacked (Lab. Code, § 5302), 
that no attack had been made as of the 16th day, and that the 
payment by the State Fund thus relieved the latter from 
liability (Lab. Code, § 3603). [1] Petitioner contends that 
an erroneous award cannot be saved by payment by the work-
men's compensation insurance carrier before the award be-
comes finaL Petitioner's argument is sound. [2] Under 
section 5302 any award is completely immune from collateral 
attack after the 20th day, even though in excess of the juris-
diction of the Industrial Accident Commission. The policy 
underlying this rule is that it assures workmen that the awards 
are paid speedily and with certainty. (Thaxter v. Finn 
(1918), 178 Cal. 270, 275 [173 P. 163].) [3] But section 
5302 cannot have been intended to prevent effective recon-
sideration by the commission or review by the courts of awards 
which erroneously deny lien claims. If the section were given 
the effect for which the commission contends, then the com-
mission (by denying liens) and the workmen's compensation 
insu~ance carrier (by immediately paying awards to im-
pecunious claimants) could nullify the legislative intent which 
was pointed out and upheld in the Bryant decision (supra, 
37 Cal.2d 215, 219: an unemployed workman should not 
receive workman's compensation and unemployment benefits 
for the same period of disability) in every case wherein a 
claim of lien for unemployment benefits has been established 
before the Industrial Accident Commission. 
[4] Finally, the Industrial Accident Commission asserts 
that it cannot order the State Fund to pay the amount of the 
lien to petitioner because, by statute, the commission can allow 
the lien only against ''any amount to be paid as com pen-· 
sation" (Lab. Code, § 4903) ; the commission argues that, after 
the October 26th payment by the State Fund, there was no 
''amount to be paid as compensation'' upon which the lien 
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could be impressed. This argument assumes that the award 
was properly paid by the State Fund. Since the State Fund 
illegally paid the compensation award after notice that peti-
tioner claimed a lien, the State Fund remains liable to the 
petitioner. (See Johnson v. Ind1tstrial Ace. Com. (1935), 
2 Cal.2d 304, 307 [ 40 P .2d 518] .)1 In similar situations it is 
uniformly held that a debtor pays his creditor at his peril 
after notice of garnishment or assignment. (See Bliss v. Cali-
fornia Cooperative Prod~wers (1947), 30 Cal.2d 240, 250 
[181 P.2d 369, 170 A.L.R. 1009]; Finch v. Finch (1909), 
12 Cal.App. 274, 280 [107 P. 594]; In re Kling (1919), 
44 Cal.App. 267, 270 [186 P. 152] .) 
For the reasons above stated the award after rehearing is 
annulled and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Accident 
Commission for proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in this case is predicated on Bryant 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32] (see, also, 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599 
[241 P.2d 530]) and for the reasons expressed in my dissent-
ing opinion in that case, I cannot agree that a lien is allow-
able here. 
1Cf. State Camp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1949), 89 Cal. 
App.2d 821, 824 [202 P.2d 86]. There an application for compensation 
came before the commission, and the compensation insurance carrier 
accepted the commission's permanent disability rating and commenced to 
make installment payments as ordered. The employe then applied for 
adjustment of compensation. A hearing was had on October 22, 1947, 
when the employe for the first time was represented by an attorney. 
On October 22, $225 in permanent disability as originally rated remained 
to be paid. Findings and award were not filed until January 26, 1948; 
meanwhile the insurer, pursuant to the original rating, had paid the $225. 
· No claim of lien by the attorney was on file. The January 26 award 
purported to require the insurer to pay $225 less $35 payable as 
attorney's fees. The District Court of Appeal concluded that the com-
mission could not require the insurer to pay an independent award of 
$35 to the attorney. It expressly pointed out that it was not passing on 
the situation where a written notice of lien claim was on file. 
